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REGULATORY POLICIES I N  
TRANSITION* 
Giandomenico Majone 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  
f o r  Appl ied  Systems 
Ana lys i s  
Laxenburg, A u s t r i a  
The t h e o r y  of  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h o i c e  a t t e m p t s  t o  i d e n t i f y  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  under which a  p a r t i c u l a r  se t  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
ar rangements  may a r i s e ,  and how t h o s e  ar rangements  change wi th  
changes i n  env i ronmenta l '  and human f a c t o r s .  Th i s  paper  i s  p r i -  
m a r i l y  concerned w i t h  t h e  r o l e  p l ayed  by c o g n i t i v e  f a c t o r s  i n  
the development of  r e g u l a t o r y  p o l i c i e s  and i n  c u r r e n t  d e b a t e s  
a b o u t  r e g u l a t o r y  reform. argued t h a t  g i v e n  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  
of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  basis of r e g u l a t i o n  and the i d i o s y n c r a t i c  char -  
a c t e r  of many r e g u l a t o r y  problems n e i t h e r  market  nor  bureau- 
c r a t i c  forms o f  c o n t r o l  o f f e r  g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  s o l u t i o n s .  
A mode of  c o n t r o l  r e l y i n g  more on s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n  and p r o f e s s i o n a l  
a d v i c e  i s  proposed a s  an  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a l t e r n a t i v e  d e s e r v i n g  ca r e -  
f u l  a n a l y s i s .  
* 
This  i s  a  r e v i s e d  v e r s i o n  o f  a  paper  p r e s e n t e d  a t  a  
Symposium on Neue P o l i t i s c h e  Gkonomie, Bad Bornburg, 4-6 
October ,  1 9 8 2 .  I t  w i l l  appear  i n  Jahrhuch d e r  Neuen 
P o l i t i s c h e n  Okonomie, K.-E.  Schenk, e d i t o r ,  1 9 8 3 .  
1 .  Old and New Forms o f  Regu la t ion  
A s  i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  governance of  t h e  economy, r e g u l a t o r y  
p o l i c i e s  occupy an  i n t e r m e d i a t e  p o s i t i o n  between t r a d i t i o n a l  
forms of  p u b l i c  i n t e r v e n t i o n  ( g e n e r a l  l a w s ,  t a x e s ,  i n c e n t i v e s ,  
inkeres t  rates ,  etc .  ) , and d i r e c t  p u b l i c  p r o v i s i o n  of  goods and 
Services. Within  t h e  g e n e r a l  r e g u l a t o r y  regime w e  can  a g a i n  
d i s t i n g u i s h  between t h e  by now classical  forms of economic regu- 
l a t i o n  ( " p r i c e  and e n t r y "  r e g u l a t i o n )  and newer forms o f  " s o c i a l "  
r e g u l a t i o n  t h a t  have become i n c r e a s i n g l y  i m p o r t a n t  d u r i n g  t h e  
l a s t  two decades .  
T r a d i t i o n a l  economic r e g u l a t i o n  t e n d s  t o  be c o n f i n e d  t o  
s p e c i f i c  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy and f o c u s e s  on p r i c e s ,  q u a l i t y  
of  services, market  and e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n s ,  l i c e n s e s  and q u o t a s .  
T y p i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  mode of r e g u l a t i o n  are t h e  need 
t o  c o n t r o l  monopoly power, " e x c e s s i v e "  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  economic r e n t  
and " e x c e s s i v e "  p r o f i t s ,  o r  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t - - a s  i n  
t h e  case of r e g u l a t i o n  of  r a d i o  and t e l e v i s i o n  b r o a d c a s t i n g  i n  
t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  Among American r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s ,  t h e  C i v i l  
A e r o n a u t i c s  Board, t h e  F e d e r a l  Trade Commission, t h e  A n t i t r u s t  
D i v i s i o n  of t h e  Department of J u s t i c e ,  and t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  and Ex- 
change Commission are w e l l  known examples of e a r l y  a t t e m p t s  by t h e  
government t o  c o n t r o l  p r i c e s  and s e r v i c e s ,  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  s e c u r i t y  
of  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and t o  d i s c o u r a g e  f r a u d u l e n t  p r a c t i c e s .  
The new s o c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n  ( e x e m p l i f i e d  by a g e n c i e s  l i k e  t h e  
Occupa t iona l  S a f e t y  and H e a l t h  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  Environmenta l  
P r o t e c t i o n  Agency, t h e  Nuclear  Regu la to ry  Commission, t h e  Consu-- 
m e r  P r o d u c t  S a f e t y  Commission, and t h e  O f f i c e  o f  C i v i l  R i g h t s )  i s  
concerned w i t h  such problems as s p i l l o v e r  c o s t s  o r  e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  
consumer i g n o r a n c e ,  r i s k ,  and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  Because t h e s e  
problems are s o  p e r v a s i v e ,  s o c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n  e x t e n d s  t o  many more 
i n d u s t r i e s  and a f f e c t s  many more consumers t h a n  t h e  o l d  k i n d  of 
r e g u l a t i o n .  I t  a l s o  a f f e c t s  much more d i r e c t l y  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  
under which goods and s e r v i c e s  are produced,  and t h e  p h y s i c a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  o u t p u t s .  
The two t y p e s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  d i f f e r  h i s t o r i c a l l y  and i n  t h e i r  
rates of growth.  While most economic r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s  were 
c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  decade  1930-1940, t h a t  i s ,  a t  t h e  peak of  F.D. 
R o o s e v e l t l s  N e w  Deal ( t h e  o n l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x c e p t i o n s  b e i n g  t h e  
I n t e r s t a t e  Commerce Commission, c r e a t e d  i n  1887, and t h e  F e d e r a l  
Trade  Commission, 1914) ,  " s o c i a l "  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s  are crea- 
t i o n s  of t h e  decade  1965-1975 ( t h e  o n l y  i m p o r t a n t  e x c e p t i o n  i s  
t h e  Food and Drug A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1 9 3 1 ) .  
Between 1970 and 1975 t h e  number of  major  economic r e g u l a -  
t o r y  a g e n c i e s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  by 25% (f rom 8  t o  1 0 )  ; t h e  number of  
major  s o c i a l  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s  by 42% (f rom 1 2  t o  17) . T h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s )  i n  t h e  same 
p e r i o d  went from 1 6 6 . 1  t o  427.6 ( a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  157%) f o r  t h e  
economic a g e n c i e s ,  and from 1449.3 t o  4251.4 (+193%) f o r  t h e  
s o c i a l  a g e n c i e s .  
2 .  Changing A t t i t u d e s  Toward Regu la t ion  
D e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  many a u t h o r s  t e n d  t o  emphasize t h e  
s imi lar i t ies  between t h e s e  two t y p e s  of  r e g u l a t i o n f 2  t h e  d i f -  
f e r e n c e s  a r e  e q u a l l y  o r  even more i m p o r t a n t .  Economic and s o c i a l  
r e g u l a t i o n  do n o t  d i f f e r  o n l y  i n  h i s t o r i c a l  o r i g i n s ,  growth r a t e s ,  
p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  and domains of  a p p l i c a t i o n ;  t h e y  a l s o  embody 
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  r e g u l a t o r y  p h i l o s o p h i e s .  
The N e w  Deal r e g u l a t o r y  commissions enjoyed a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
amount of  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n ,  whi le  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  treat- 
ing tf ie s o c i a l  r e g u l a t o r y  agenc i e s  was i n s p i r e d  by a  deep s u s p i -  
c i o n  t h a t  they  would abuse t h e i r  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  a u t h o r i t y .  I n  an 
e f f o r t  t o  reduce t h i s  r i s k ,  Congress n o t  on ly  a s s igned  s p e c i f i c  
g o a l s  and t i m e  l i m i t s  f o r  t h e i r  f u l f i l l m e n t  ( e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  environmenta l  r e g u l a t i o n ) ,  b u t  even p r e s c r i b e d  t h e  admin- 
i s t r a t i v e  and p o l i c y  t o o l s  t o  be used. I t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  re- 
view how t h i s  change i n  a t t i t u d e s  came about .  
F a i t h  i n  t h e  power of  e x p e r t i s e  a s  an i n s t rumen t  of  gover- 
nance-- technical  e x p e r t i s e  which n e i t h e r  l e g i s l a t o r s  o r  " l a y "  
c o u r t s  no r  b u r e a u c r a t i c  g e n e r a l i s t s  presumably possess--has been 
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  sou rce  of  l e g i t i m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
d i s c r e t i o n  g r a n t e d  t o  r e g u l a t o r y  commissions. For w r i t e r s  of t h e  
New Deal l i k e  Merle Fainsod ,  r e g u l a t o r y  commissions emerged and 
became in s t rumen t s  of governance f o r  i n d u s t r y  p r e c i s e l y  because  
Congress and t h e  c o u r t s  proved unab le  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  " g r e a t  func- 
t i o n a l  impe ra t i ve"  o f  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n .  Such commissions "commended 
themselves  because  t hey  o f f e r e d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a ch i ev ing  ex- 
p e r t n e s s  i n  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  of s p e c i a l  problems,  r e l a t i v e  freedom 
from t h e  e x i g e n c i e s  of p a r t y  p o l i t i c s  i n  t h e i r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  and 
e x p e d i t i o u s n e s s  i n  t h e i r  d i ~ ~ o s i t i o n " . ~  Among t h e  impor t an t  rea -  
sons  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  the r e g u l a t o r y  commissions, Cushman, 
w r i t i n g  i n  1 9 3 7 ,  ment ions  t h e  g r e a t e r  e a s e  i n  r e c r u i t i n g  e x p e r t s  
f o r  an independent  agency t han  f o r  e x e c u t i v e  depar tments .  4 
According t o  Landis ,  " t h e  demand f o r  e x p e r t n e s s ,  f o r  a  con- 
t i n u i t y  of concern ,  n a t u r a l l y  l e a d s  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of  a u t h o r i t i e s  
l i m i t e d  i n  t h e i r  s p h e r e  of a c t i o n  t o  t h e  new t a s k s  t h a t  government 
may conclude t o  u n d e r t ak e" .  I n  f a c t ,  Landis  s u g g e s t s ,  t h e  supp ly  
of r e g u l a t i o n  c r e a t e s  i t s  own demand of  e x p e r t i s e :  
With t h e  rise of  r e g u l a t i o n ,  t h e  need f o r  e x p e r t n e s s  
became dominant;  f o r  t h e  a r t  o f  r e g u l a t i n g  an i n d u s t r y  
r e q u i r e s  knowledge of  d e t a i l s  of  i t s  o p e r a t i o n ,  a b i l i t y  
t o  s h i f t  r eq u i r em en t s  a s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  of t h e  i n d u s t r y  
may d i c t a t e ,  t h e  p u r s u i t  of  e n e r g e t i c  measures upon t h e  
appearance  o f  an emergency, and t h e  power th rough  enforce -  
ment t o  r e a l i z e  co n c lu s ions  a s  t o  p o l i c y . 5  
To be s u r e ,  t h e  N e w  Deal advoca tes  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  knew t h a t ,  
a s  Fainsod p u t  it, t h e  e x p e r t n e s s  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  is  n o t  
always above s u s p i c i o n .  But t h e y  r e j e c t e d  any s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  
t h e  q u a l i t y  of r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s  cou ld  be  improved by l i m i t -  
i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n .  I s s u e s  of f a c t  shou ld  be handled 
by e x p e r t s ,  u s i n g  whatever  methods appear  t o  be most a p p r o p r i a t e ;  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  f i n d i n g s  of  f a c t  a r e  t o  be regarded  a s  f i n a l .  
J u d i c i a l  review of t h e  ev idence  used i n  r e ach ing  a  d e c i s i o n  
would be a  s e r i o u s  t h r e a t  t o  " t h e  ve ry  v i r t u e  o f  s p e c i a l i z e d  
knowledge which c o n s t i t u t e s  one of  t h e  c h i e f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  
t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  commissions". 6 
I t  d i d  n o t  t a k e  l o n g ,  however, f o r  t h e  i d e a l i z e d  p i c t u r e  o f  
r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s  a s  t h e  v e r y  embodiment o f  Weberian Zweck- 
r a t i o n a l i t a t ,  t o  be r e p l a c e d  by a  growing d i s c o n t e n t  w i t h  t h e  
e n t i r e  p r o ce s s .  A t  f i r s t ,  t h e  crit icisms w e r e  of  a  t e c h n i c a l  
c h a r a c t e r ,  f o c u s i n g  on t h e  f a u l t y  l o g i c  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  t y p e s  of  
d e c i s i o n s .  For  example, economists po in t ed  o u t  t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c e  
of c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  r a t e  l e v e l s  f o r  r e g u l a t e d  f i r m s  on t h e  b a s i s  
o f  h i s t o r i c a l  o r  "sunk" c o s t s  v i o l a t e s  t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  
"bygones a r e  f o r e v e r  bygones" and shou ld  n o t  a f f e c t  c u r r e n t  dec i -  
s i o n s .  A s  George S t i g l e r ,  one of  t h e  s h a r p e s t  c r i t i c s  of  t h e  regu- 
l a t o r y  approach,  c a u s t i c a l l y  remarked, " h i s t o r i c a l  c o s t s  have 
powerful  sway o v e r  u n t u t o r e d  minds. The I n t e r n a l  Revenue S e r v i c e  
i n s i s t s  t h a t  c o r p o r a t i o n s '  a s s e s t s  be s o  va lued .  The p u b l i c  
u t i l i t y  commissions c o n s i d e r  h i s t o r i c a l  c o s t s  a  r e l e v a n t  o r  
even d e c i s i v e  i t e m  i n  s e t t i n g  r a t e s " .  7 
The methods used by t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  i n  de te rmin ing  t h e  " f a i r "  
r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on e q u i t y  c a p i t a l  were s i m i l a r l y  shown t o  be 
b e s e t  wi th  p r a c t i c a l  and concep tua l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  For many o t h e r  
problems--from t h e  de t e rmina t i on  of  t h e  r a t e  s t r u c t u r e  t o  t h e  a l l o -  
c a t i o n  of j o l n t  c o s t s  among d i f f e r e n t  se rv ices - -on ly  conven t iona l  
o r  a r b i t r a r y  s o l u t i o n s  seemed t o  be a v a i l a b l e .  Unders tandably ,  
many economists  reached  t h e  conc lu s ion  t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  p roces s  
l a c k s  sound concep tua l  founda t ions .  
The p r o g r e s s i v e  e r o s i o n  o f  t h e  f a i t h  i n  t h e  e x p e r t i s e  of  
t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  l e d  t o  new, deeper  q u e s t i o n s .  The key i s s u e  now 
became: How i s  t h e  enormous power of r e g u l a t o r s ,  who a r e  appo in t ed ,  
n o t  el lected o f f i c i a l s ,  t o  be c o n t r o l l e d ?  The assumption t h a t  con- 
g r e s s i o n a l  s t a t u t e s  would c o n t r o l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n  had 
proved t o  be  i l l - f o u n d e d ,  s i n c e  Congress had d e l e g a t e d  r e g u l a t o r y  
a u t h o r i t y  i n  ve ry  broad terms.  The c o u r t s ,  t o o ,  had been very  
h e s i t a n t  i n  reviewing r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s  and f i n d i n g s  of f a c t .  
F i n a l l y ,  it had proved e q u a l l y  i l l u s o r y  " t o  look  t o  r e g u l a t o r s  
a s  " s c i e n t i s t s " ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  o r  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t s ,  whose d i s -  
c r e t i o n  would be  h e l d  i n  check by t h e  t e n e t s  of t h e i r  d i s c i p l i n e .  
I t  has  become a p p a r e n t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no s c i e n t i f i c  d i s c i p l i n e  
of  r e g u l a t i o n  ... I, 8 
I n  t h e  1950s ano the r  type  of  cr i t ic i sm made i t s  appearance  
and soon ga ined  widespread accep tance :  t h e  " cap tu re "  t heo ry  of 
r e g u l a t i o n .  The e s sence  o f  t h i s  t h e o r y ,  a s  summarized by S t i g l e r ,  
i s  t h a t  " a s  a  r u l e ,  r e g u l a t i o n  i s  a c q u i r e d  by t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  and 
i s  designed and ope ra t ed  p r imar i ly  f o r  i t s  b e n e f i t " . '  But how 
does it happen t h a t  r e g u l a t o r y  agenc ies  a r e  cap tu red  by t h e  very 
i n t e r e s t s  they a r e  supposed t o  r e g u l a t e ?  Some au tho r s  ( f o r  exam- 
p l e ,  S t i g l e r )  exp la ined  t h e  phenomenon i n  terms of t h e  n a t u r e  of 
t he  (democrat ic)  p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  and of a  " r a t i o n a l "  ( i . e .  , 
ut i l i ty -maximiz ing)  theory  of p o l i t i c a l  and b u r e a u c r a t i c  behavior .  
Marvin Be rns t e in  suggested t h a t  vague s t a t u t o r y  language was 
t h e  ( o r  a t  l e a s t ,  a )  cause  of t h e  c a p t u r e  of r e g u l a t o r y  agenc ies  
by t h e  r e g u l a t e d  i n d u s t r i e s .  According t o  h i s  theory  of t h e  
" l i f e  c y c l e "  of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  agenc ie s ,  once t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sup- 
p o r t  t h a t  l e d  t o  t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  of  a  new agency beg ins  t o  f ade ,  
vague l e g i s l a t i v e  d i r e c t i o n s  g i v e  t h e  r e g u l a t e d  i n d u s t r i e s  t h e  pos- 
s i b i l i t y  of c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  l a w ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and implementa- 
t i o n .  A s  t h e  i n i t i a l  enthusiasm i s  r ep l aced  by r o u t i n e  bureau- 
c r a t i c  behavior ,  t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  tend t o  succumb t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  
i n c e n t i v e s  and b r i b e s  which i n d u s t r y  can  o f f e r  them i n  exchange 
f o r  a  l a x  a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  law. The remedy suggested by Bern- 
s t e i n  and o t h e r  s c h o l a r s  was t o  reduce a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n  
by means of l e g i s l a t i o n  which c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  agency g o a l s  and pre-  
c i s e l y  descr ibed  t h e  ins t ruments  t h a t  were t o  be used t o  reach  
those  goa l s .  
The l e g i s l a t i o n  of t h e  1960s and 1970s, e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  number 
of new o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  t he  f i e l d  of s o c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n ,  can only  
be unders tood a g a i n s t  t h i s  background of c r i t i c i s m s  and proposa ls  
t o  r e s t r i c t  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  of r e g u l a t o r y  agenc ies .  
3 .  Tasks and Ins t ruments  of S o c i a l  Regulat ion 
Good examples of t h e  new "tough" a t t i t u d e  of Congress a r e  t h e  
1970 Clean A i r  Act Amendments, t h e  Occupational  Sa fe ty  and Health 
Act of t h e  same y e a r ,  and t h e  1972 Federa l  Water P o l l u t i o n  Cont ro l  
Act. These and o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  l e g i s l a t i v e  enactments of t h e  
1970s ( l i k e  t h e  Toxic Substances Control  Act of 1976) r e p r e s e n t  
major s h i f t s  from prev ious  models based on d e c e n t r a l i z e d  regula -  
t i o n  and vo lun ta ry  compliance, toward r e g u l a t i o n  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
l e v e l  by means of  l e g a l l y  enforceab le  s t anda rds .  
~ h u s ,  t h e  f i r s t  f e d e r a l  law on a i r  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l ,  enac ted  
i n  1955, e s s e n t i a l l y  provided g ran t s - in -a id  f o r  s t a t e  and l o c a l  
a i r  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  agenc ies .  The r o l e  of t h e  f e d e r a l  govern- 
ment was l a r g e l y  conf ined  t o  t he  p rov i s ion  of  t e c h n i c a l  adv ice  
and a s s i s t a n c e ,  and t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  and p u b l i c a t i o n  of  a i r  po l lu -  
t i o n  in format ion  by t h e  Surgeon General.  The Clean A i r  A c t  of 
1963 d i d  l i t t l e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  f e d e r a l  r o l e  i n  a i r  
p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  o t h e r  than a s s ign ing  an important  f u n c t i o n  f o r  
t h e  f e d e r a l  government i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  harmful p o l l u t a n t s .  
But congres s iona l  a t t i t u d e s  had a l r eady  changed by 1967, 
when a  new A i r  Qua l i t y  Act placed g r e a t e r  emphasis on f e d e r a l  
r e g u l a t i o n .  The primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  s e t t i n g  a i r  q u a l i t y  
s t anda rds  and f o r  developing implementation p l ans  t o  a t t a i n  t h e  
s t anda rds  "wi th in  a  reasonable  t ime" was s t i l l  placed  on the  
s t a t e s ;  b u t  now the  S e c r e t a r y  of t h e  Department of  Hea l th ,  Edu- 
c a t i o n ,  and Welfare (HEW) was au tho r i zed  t o  develop s t anda rds  
and implementation p l ans  f o r  s t a t e s  t h a t  f a i l e d  t o  comply. 
Despi te  g r e a t  i n i t i a l  haps, t h e  a c t u a l  r e s u l t s  of t h e  1967 
A c t  were d i sappo in t ing .  The r o o t  cause  of  t h e  f a i l u r e ,  according 
t o  many a n a l y s t s ,  was t he  f a c t  t h a t  t he  Act had l e f t  t o  t h e  s t a t e s  
t he  major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  implementating t h e  l a w ' s  r equ i r e -  
ments--requirements t h a t  had n o t  been s p e c i f i c  enough. Conse- 
quen t ly ,  t he  Clean A i r  Act of 1970 ass igned  t o  t h e  newly- 
established Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the goal of 
achieving "healthy" air by 1975. The tasks which EPA had to 
perform in order to achieve this goal were specified in great 
detail in the law" : 
1. Thirty days after the passage of the act, propose 
national ambient air quality standards to protect 
public health and welfare. 
2. Approve state implementation plans that prescribed 
specific emission limitations for different types of 
polluters within a year after the proposal of the air 
quality standards. 
3. Set emission levels for new and modified stationary 
sources of pollution, for pollutants considered to be 
toxic by EPA, and for motor vehicles. 
4. If the states fail to develop their implementation plans, 
the agency should take over. 
To make sure that EPA would not evade these requirements, 
the act provided the possibility of citizen enforcement; i.e., 
citizens could sue EPA for not performing non-discretionary 
duties. Moreover, the standard-setting process was not to be 
delayed or watered down by cost or other non-health considera- 
tions. Section 5 (g) of the 1963 Clean Air Act had admitted the 
necessity of giving "due consideration to the practicability of 
complying with such standards as may be applicable and to the 
physical and economic feasibility of securing abatements of any 
pollution proved ..." Under the 1970 Amendments, however, health 
considerations would be the sole determinants of air quality 
standards; and the standards were to be set at levels capable 
of p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  most s e n s i t i v e  segments of t h e  popula t ion .  I n  
sum, EPA was t o  promulgate s t anda rds  "with t e e t h " ,  and t h e  d i s c r e -  
t i o n  of s t a t e  and l o c a l  agenc ies  i n  implementing them would be 
s e v e r e l y  l i m i t e d  by t h e  requirement  t h a t  a c c e p t a b l e  implementa- 
t i o n  p l ans  be submit ted t o  EPA. 
L e g i s l a t i v e  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  developments i n  t h e  a r e a  of 
water  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  fo l low a  r a t h e r  s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n .  Before 
1974, t r u l y  n a t i o n a l  s t anda rds  f o r  water  q u a l i t y  d i d  n o t  e x i s t  
i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  s i n c e  r e g u l a t i o n  of i n t r a s t a t e  d r ink ing  
water  q u a l i t y  was t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of i n d i v i d u a l  s t a t e s .  The 
f i n d i n g s  of t h e  Nat ional  Water Commission Report  of 1973 concern- 
i ng  s e r i o u s  imbalances i n  s t a t e  and l o c a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  ( s o  t h a t ,  
f o r  example, people  l i v i n g  i n  l a r g e  c i t i e s  u s u a l l y  had d r ink ing  
water  of h ighe r  q u a l i t y  than  people  i n  sma l l e r  communit ies) ,  and 
t h e  presence of p o t e n t i a l  ca rc inogens  i n  many d r i n k i n g  wate r  
systems r evea l ed  by a  survey conducted by EPA i n  1 974, l e d  t o  
t h e  demand f o r  n a t i o n a l  r e g u l a t i o n  of d r i n k i n g  water  q u a l i t y .  
Inadequate  s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t y ,  l a c k  of c e n t r a l i z e d  admin- 
i s t r a t i o n  and of  f o r c e f u l  enforcement,  l a r g e  i n t e r s t a t e  d i f f e r -  
ences  i n  d r i n k i n g  wate r  s t anda rds :  t h e s e  were t h e  problems Con- 
g r e s s  a t tempted t o  s o l v e  wi th  t h e  new Water P o l l u t i o n  Cont ro l  
Act. Again, EPA's g o a l s  and t e c h n i c a l  means were p r e c i s e l y  de- 
f i n e d .  Within one y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  a c t  was passed,  t h e  agency 
w a s  t o  promulgate e f f l u e n t  g u i d e l i n e s  t h a t  des igna ted  a l lowable  
d i scha rges  f o r  v a r i o u s  i n d u s t r i a l  c a t e g o r i e s .  Within two y e a r s  
a f t e r  t h e  a c t  was passed,  permi t s  would be i s sued  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  
manufacturers  t h a t  would ach ieve  t h e  g o a l s  of "Best  P r a c t i c a b l e  
Technology" and "Best  Avai lab le  Technology" wi th in  t h e  allowed 
t ime l i m i t s .  And, a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  Clean A i r  Act Amendments, 
e f f l u e n t  and ambient s t anda rds  f o r  water  were t o  be s e t  on t h e  
b a s i s  of h e a l t h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  on ly .  
Congress ional  a c t i o n  l ead ing  t o  t h e  Occupational  S a f e t y  and 
Health Act was a l s o  a  response  t o  widespread c r i t i c i s m  of s t a t e  
r e g u l a t i o n  i n  t h i s  a r e a .  Lack of s u f f i c i e n t l y  t r a i n e d  personne l  
and of  r e s e a r c h  f a c i l i t i e s ,  b u r e a u c r a t i c  i n e f f i c i e n c y ,  "cap ture"  
by bus ines s  i n t e r e s t s ,  and weak enforcement,  were t h e  most £re-  
quen t ly  mentioned f a i l u r e s  of s t a t e  r e g u l a t i o n .  "Mandatory s t an -  
da rds ,  ..., an informed and s t r o n g  enforcement f o r c e ,  and a  g r e a t e r  
emphasis on occupa t iona l  d i s e a s e  were seen  t o  be necessary  compo- 
nen t s  of a  s i n c e r e  f e d e r a l  e f f o r t  t o  reduce i n d u s t r i a l  a c c i d e n t s  
and d i s e a s e .  The embodiment of t h i s  e f f o r t  was t h e  Occupational  
S a f e t y  and Heal th  Act  of 1 9 7 0 " .  12 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  agency r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  admin i s t e r ing  t h e  
p rov i s ions  of t h e  a c t  i s  t h e  Occupational  S a f e t y  and Heal th  Admin- 
i s t r a t i o n  (OSHA) , l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  Department o f  Labor. OSHA 
i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  s e t  s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  s t a n d a r d s ,  and t o  conduct  
i n s p e c t i o n s  a t  workplaces t o  ensure  compliance wi th  t h e  s t anda rds  
and wi th  t h e  "gene ra l  du ty"  o b l i g a t i o n  of employers i n  a l l  c a s e s  
n o t  covered by s p e c i f i c  s t anda rds .  By comparison with  t h e  p r e c i s e  
t a s k s  ass igned  t o  EPA, t h e  Occupational  S a f e t y  and Heal th  Act 
may appear  t o  g i v e  OSHA cons ide rab le  d i s c r e t i o n .  I n  f a c t ,  OSHA's 
goa l  i s  s t a t e d  i n  very  g e n e r a l  terms: " t o  a s s u r e  a s  f a r  a s  pos- 
s i b l e  every working man and woman i n  t h e  Nation s a f e  and hea l th -  
f u l  working cond i t i ons" .  
Yet, t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  of t h e  agency, and of s t a t e  implementa- 
t i o n  agenc ies ,  i s  s e v e r e l y  r e s t r i c t e d  i n  a  number of ways. F i r s t ,  
t he  law s p e c i f i e s  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  ins t ruments  t o  be used. These 
a r e  p r imar i ly  s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  s t anda rds ,  having t h e  f o r c e  of law, 
r a t h e r  than ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a  use-permit system which OSHA has  no 
l e g a l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  r e q u i r e .  The law p r e s c r i b e s  i n  g r e a t  d e t a i l  
t he  procedure t o  be followed i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  s t anda rds .  Also, 
Sec t ion  8  of t h e  a c t  has  been g e n e r a l l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  l e g a l l y  
p rec lud ing  OSHA i n s p e c t o r s  from providing any c o n s u l t a t i o n  v i s i t s  
on an employer ' s  premises  (any e n t e r i n g  upon t h e  employer ' s  pre-  
m i s e s  i s  regarded a s  a  formal i n s p e c t i o n )  . F i n a l l y ,  any s t a t e  t h a t  
d e s i r e s  t o  assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  developing and en fo rc ing  i t s  
own occupa t iona l  s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  s t a n d a r d s ,  must s a t i s f y  t h e  
s t r i n g e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  l i s t e d  i n  g r e a t  d e t a i l  i n  Sec t ion  18 ( c )  of 
t h e  a c t .  S t a t e  agenc ies  a r e  r equ i r ed  t o  supply any in format ion  
r equ i r ed  by OSHA while  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of Labor must make a  cont inu-  
i ng  e v a l u a t i o n  of s t a t e  p l ans ,  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  r i g h t  t o  withdraw 
approval  f o r  cause .  
4 .  Resulatorv Dilemmas 
The f e a r  of " cap tu re"  of t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  agenc ies  by t h e  
r e g u l a t e d  i n d u s t r i e s ,  and t h e  d e s i r e  t o  o b t a i n  quick and t a n g i b l e  
r e s u l t s  i n  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  and i n  occupa t iona l  h e a l t h  and 
s a f e t y ,  have induced Congress t o  e n a c t  l e g i s l a t i o n  s e v e r e l y  re-  
s t r i c t i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n .  I t  would be u n f a i r  t o  sug- 
g e s t  t h a t  nothing has  been accomplished by t h i s  method; and t h e r e  
i s  l i t t l e  evidence t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  r e g u l a t o r y  agenc ies  have su r -  
rendered t o  t h e  p r e s s u r e  of powerful economic i n t e r e s t s .  
On ba lance ,  however, t h e  r e s u l t s  of  such "agency f o r c i n g "  13 
l e g i s l a t i o n  must be judged nega t ive ly .  The c o s t  of ach iev ing  some 
measure of  improvement i n  t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  ambient and working 
environment has been,  by a l l  a v a i l a b l e  e s t i m a t e s ,  s t a g g e r i n g .  
Also, r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s  r e v e a l  a  c o n s i s t e n t  b i a s  i n  f avo r  of 
des ign  s t anda rds  r a t h e r  than  t h e  more f l e x i b l e  performance s t an -  
dards .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  number of such d e c i s i o n s  has  been a lmost  
n e g l i g i b l e  by comparison with  a c t u a l  needs.  
I n  i t s  f i r s t  t e n  y e a r s  of e x i s t e n c e ,  f o r  example, OSHA has  
promulgated only  t e n  new occupa t iona l  h e a l t h  s t anda rds :  t h r e e  
between 1970 and 1974 ( a s b e s t o s ,  v i n y l  c h l o r i d e ,  and a  group of 
1 4  carc inogens)  , one i n  1976 (coke ovens) , and s i x  i n  1978 ( l e a d ,  
a r s e n i c ,  c o t t o n  d u s t ,  benzene, a c r y l o n i t r i l e ,  and DBCP). The 
benzene s tandard  was immediately i n v a l i d a t e d  by t h e  Court  of 
Appeals of t h e  5 th  C i r c u i t ,  on t h e  ground t h a t  OSHA had f a i l e d  
t o  make q u a n t i t a t i v e  e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  b e n e f i t s  of t h e  s t anda rd ,  
and weigh them a g a i n s t  t h e  c o s t s  t o  see i f  t h e  ba lance  was 
" reasonable" .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  of  t h e  v i n y l  c h l o r i d e  (VC) s t anda rd ,  i n d u s t r y  
opposed t h e  proposed l e v e l  of 1 p a r t  pe r  m i l l i o n  (ppm) on t h e  
grounds t h a t  OSHA lacked  s u f f i c i e n t  s c i e n t i f i c  evidence on t h e  
harmfulness of VC a t  low doses;  t h a t  it was t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  
impossible  f o r  p l a n t s  producing VC t o  meet t h e  1 ppn c e i l i n g ;  and 
t h a t  t h e  c o s t  of approaching t h e  c e i l i n g  would f o r c e  t h e  companies 
o u t  of  bus ines s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  overcome i n d u s t r y ' s  r e s i s t e n c e ,  OSHA 
f i n a l l y  promulgated a  somewhat weakened permanent s t anda rd .  These 
two b r i e f  examples should  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  problems 
a  r e g u l a t o r y  agency f a c e s  i n  s e t t i n g  numerical ly  p r e c i s e  and 
l e g a l l y  binding s t anda rds  wi thout  an adequate s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  
o r  c l e a r  knowledge of  t h e  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  of i t s  d e c i s i o n s .  
Toward t h e  end of t h e  1970 I s ,  t he  a t t i t u d e  of Congress and of 
p o l i t i c a l  execut ives  had s t a r t e d  t o  change once more. The new 
Clean A i r  Amendments of 1977 gave express ion  t o  a  growing d i s sa -  
t i s f  a c t i o n  with s o c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n ,  and t o  new preoccupat ions  
c r e a t e d  by t h e  energy c r i s i s .  I n  t h e  words of t h e  Senate  r e p o r t ,  
t h e  new law attempted " t o  balance the  economic a s p i r a t i o n s  of t h e  
country wi th  t h e  need f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  of t h e  pub l i c  h e a l t h  and w e l -  
f a r e  from the  adverse  impacts of a i r  p o l l u t i o n " .  The House 
r e p o r t  was equa l ly  e x p l i c i t  i n  s t a t i n g  t h e  need f o r  cons ider ing  
economic f a c t o r s  i n  determining acceptab le  l e v e l s  of a i r  q u a l i t y .  
The "heal th-only"  r u l e  of 1970 had become an ambiguous "balancing" 
r u l e  seven yea r s  l a t e r .  
By t h e  summer of 1978, EPA and t h e  o t h e r  r egu la to ry  agencies  
were exposed t o  s t rong  p r e s s u r e s ,  coming from such bodies  a s  t h e  
Council of Economic Advisers ,  t he  Council on Wage and P r i c e  Sta-  
b i l i t y ,  and even from t h e  c o u r t s ,  t o  reduce t h e  c o s t s  of proposed 
h e a l t h ,  s a f e t y ,  and environmental r e g u l a t i o n s .  The d i f f i c u l t i e s  
of s e t t i n g  compulsory s tandards  with  less than  adequate informa- 
t i o n  were a l s o  becoming inc reas ing ly  c l e a r .  A l a r g e  number of 
e x i s t i n g  s tandards  were chal lenged by indus t ry  spokesmen and by 
independent r e sea rche r s  a l l e g i n g  t h a t  t he  s c i e n t i f i c  evidence was 
inconclus ive .  The unders tandable  response of t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  has 
been inc reas ing  r i s k  ave r s ion ,  causing a  gene ra l  slowdown of regu- 
l a t o r y  a c t i v i t i e s .  
These con t rad ic to ry  developments r e f l e c t  s e r i o u s  ambigui t ies  
i n  t h e  underlying r egu la to ry  phi losphy.  Thus, i n  some cases  t h e  
law r e q u i r e s  t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  t o  set s t anda rds  on the  b a s i s  of h e a l t h  
o r  environmental c r i t e r i a  on ly .  I n  o t h e r  cases  some balancing of 
c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  i s  c a l l e d  f o r ,  b u t  no g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  doing t h i s  
a r e  provided and t h e  s t a t u t o r y  language i s  unc lea r .  For t h e  Occu- 
p a t i o n a l  Safe ty  and Heal th  Act, f o r  example, t h e  c o u r t s  had t o  
determine whether s e c t i o n  6 (b)  ( 5 )  of t h e  a c t ,  which speaks only 
of " f e a s i b i l i t y " ,  a l lows  t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  t o  cons ide r  economic a s  
w e l l  a s  t echno log ica l  f a c t o r s  i n  s e t t i n g  s t anda rds  f o r  t o x i c  
substances .  
Because of t h e  ambigu i t i e s ,  r e g u l a t o r s  a r e  faced  with  almost 
i n s o l u b l e  dilemmas. If they base t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  on s c i e n t i f i c  
c r i t e r i a  on ly ,  they a r e  accused of imposing excess ive  c o s t s  on 
t h e  economy. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  they a t tempt  t o  balance bene- 
f i t s  a g a i n s t  c o s t s ,  they run t h e  r i s k  of adopt ing  s t anda rds  t h a t  
merely codi fy  e x i s t i n g  economic and t e c h n i c a l  condi t ions- - to  t h e  
de t r imen t  of t h e i r  normative c h a r a c t e r .  One can,  i n  f a c t ,  argue 
t h a t  one of t h e  main goa l s  of environmental  and h e a l t h  s t anda rds  
i s  t o  channel growth away from hazardous i n d u s t r i e s  and m a t e r i a l s  
toward s a f e r  f o m s  of product ion and employment. But it  i s  hard 
t o  s e e  how a  " f e a s i b l e "  s t anda rd  ( i n  t h e  sense i n  which t h i s  term 
has  been r e c e n t l y  used) can provide t h e  necessary s i g n a l s .  
Le t  us  now assume t h a t  t h e  law r e q u i r e s  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  t o  base 
h i s  d e c i s i o n  ( f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  " v i r t u a l l y  s a f e "  dose 
f o r  a  t o x i c  subs tance)  on s c i e n t i f i c  c r i t e r i a  on ly .  The a c t u a l  
process of s tandard  s e t t i n g  involves  a  number of very d e l i c a t e  
and s u b j e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n s .  The t e c h n i c a l  co re  of a l l .  t o x i c o l o g i c a l  
procedures used i n  s t anda rd  s e t t i n g  i s  a  dose-response model es tab-  
l i s h i n g  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between d i f f e r e n t  doses  of t h e  t o x i c  sub- 
s t ance  and the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of response of t h e  human organism. A 
curve i s  f i t t e d  t o  the  observa t ions  i n  t h e  observable  range ( f a i r l y  
high dose l e v e l s  and corresponding responses )  and then  extrapo-  
l a t e d  downward t o  determine t h e  v i r t u a l l y  s a f e  dose .  
There a r e  t h r e e  major problems wi th  t h i s  procedure .  F i r s t ,  
t h e  choice  of t h e  e x t r a p o l a t i n g  func t ion  can  have a major e f f e c t  
on t h e  va lue  of t h e  v i r t u a l l y  s a f e  dose--up t o  100,000 f o l d  
d i f f e r e n c e s  accord ing  t o  t h e  Advisory Committee on Sa fe ty  Evalua- 
t i o n  of t h e  U . S .  Food and Drug Adminis t ra t ion .  Second, t h e  d i f -  
f e r e n t  e x t r a p o l a t i n g  f u n c t i o n s  o f t e n  cannot  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from 
each o t h e r  i n  t h e  range of t h e  observable  responses .  F i n a l l y ,  no 
f i r m  s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  now e x i s t s  f o r  choosing among t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  A s  an exper ienced s c i e n t i s t  has  w r i t t e n ,  "Al l  pre- 
s e n t  s a f e t y  e v a l u a t i o n  procedures  ... must be regarded a s  mathema- 
t i c a l  formalisms whose correspondence wi th  t h e  r e a l i t i e s  of low- 
dose e f f e c t  i s ,  and may long remain, l a r g e l y  c o n j e c t u r a l " .  1 5  
I t  may be argued t h a t  i f  t h e r e  i s  no f i r m  s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  
f o r  choosing among t h e  d i f f e r e n t  mathematical  models, t hen  one 
should p r e f e r  t h e  s a f e s t  o r  most conse rva t ive  procedure.  One 
problem with  t h i s  argument i s  t h a t  it i s  n o t  c l e a r  where one 
should s t o p :  it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  be conse rva t ive  i n  a c o n s i s t e n t  
manner, un l e s s  one i s  prepared t o  propose a zero l e v e l  of expo- 
s u r e  i n  each c a s e ,  i . e .  t o  ban t h e  use of t h e  subs tance .  Thus t h e  
r e g u l a t o r  i s  faced  with  another  dilemma. A s  a d e c i s i o n  r u l e ,  
conservat ism i n  t h e  f a c e  of r i s k  i s  an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  a s  t h e  n i n i -  
max o r  t h e  "most l i k e l y  event"  p r i n c i p l e s ,  o r  indeed any p r i n c i -  
p l e  t h a t  does n o t  balance expected r i s k s  a g a i n s t  expected bene- 
f i t s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  on ly  c o n s i s t e n t  (Bayesian) d e c i s i o n  
procedure r e q u i r e s  in format ion- -pr io r  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of a l l  pos s i -  
b l e  s c i e n t i f i c  hypotheses ,  u t i l i t i e s  f o r  a l l  p o s s i b l e  consequences-- 
which no r e g u l a t o r  i s  l i k e l y  t o  supply .  
P o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  a r e  a l s o  conf ron ted  wi th  a  s e r i o u s  dilemma. 
Lawmakers, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  a r e  very  r e l u c t a n t  
t o  p l a c e  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  t h e  hands of p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s .  The e n t i r e  
r e g u l a t o r y  s t r u c t u r e  i s  set  up t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  r i g h t s  of t h e  regu- 
l a t e d  from a r b i t r a r y  s h i f t s  i n  p o s i t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  admin- 
i s t r a t o r s .  However, environmental  and h e a l t h  s t anda rds  should  be 
con t inuous ly  r e v i s e d  a s  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge improves, e m p i r i c a l  
evidence accumulates ,  and socioeconomic c o n d i t i o n s  and p u b l i c  
pe rcep t ions  change. The more u n c e r t a i n  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  of  
r e g u l a t i o n  and t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  need f o r  f l e x i b i l i t y  and a d a p t a b i l -  
i t y ,  t h e  more d i s c r e t i o n  should  be l e f t  t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  agenc ies .  
But p r e s e n t  s t a t u t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n s  set narrow l i m i t s  t o  admin i s t r a -  
t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n .  
F i n a l l y ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  predicament of e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s ,  l a b o r  
unions ,  and o t h e r  " p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t "  c o a l i t i o n s .  These groups  have 
played a  key r o l e  i n  t h e  development of s o c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n .  Largely  
because of  t h e i r  e f f o r t s ,  major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  h e a l t h  and env i -  
ronmental  i s s u e s  has  been moved from t h e  l o c a l  and s t a t e  l e v e l  t o  
t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  and from semi-public p r o f e s s i o n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
(such a s  t h e  American Conference of Governmental I n d u s t r i a l  Hygie- 
n i s t s )  t o  f e d e r a l  agenc i e s .  I n s t e a d  of "consensus s t a n d a r d s "  
accep ted  by i n d u s t r y  on a  vo lun t a ry  b a s i s ,  w e  now have l e g a l l y  
e n f o r c e a b l e  n a t i o n a l  s t anda rds .  But t h e s e  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n  of power, r e s o u r c e s ,  and s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t y  have n o t  pro- 
duced t h e  r e s u l t s  a n t i c i p a t e d  by t h e  advoca tes  of an expanded 
f e d e r a l  r o l e  i n  s o c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n .  Fede ra l  agenc i e s  have been 
fo rced  t o  assume a  g r e a t e r  s h a r e  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l  
c o s t s  of implementation than  was o r i g i n a l l y  envis ioned .  Federal  
s t anda rds ,  though l e g a l l y  en fo rceab le ,  have been few i n  number 
and weakened by " f e a s i b i l i t y "  requirements  and l a c k  of adequate  
s c i e n t i f i c  suppor t .  Despi te  i n i t i a l  hopes of g r e a t  methodologi- 
c a l  p rog res s  i n  s tandard-se t t ing- -a  hope based on t h e  s u p e r i o r  
f i n a n c i a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  r e sou rces  of t h e  f e d e r a l  government-- 
t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  of  s t anda rds  s t i l l  remains an a r t  r a t h e r  t han  a  
s c i ence .  I n  f a c t ,  s i n c e  r e g u l a t o r y  agenc ies  r e l y  on informal  
procedures  i n  combining s c i e n t i f i c  evidence wi th  economic and 
o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  l o g i c  of t h e  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  process  
has become, i f  any th ing ,  even more opaque. 
5. Regulatory Reform 
A s  t h e  preceding d i scuss ion  i n d i c a t e s ,  s o c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n  i n  
t h e  United S t a t e s  today r e p r e s e n t s  a  negative-sum game i n  which 
t h e  expected l o s s e s  of a l l  t h e  p l a y e r s  g r e a t l y  exceed t h e i r  ex- 
pec ted  ga ins .  What i s  needed i s  a  fundamental r e s t r u c t u r i n g  -of 
procedures ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and ph i lo soph ie s  a long l i n e s  t h a t  ex- 
p l i c i t l y  recognize  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  and complexity of r e g u l a t o r y  
d e c i s i o n s .  
Recent p r o p o s a l s  of  r e g u l a t o r y  reform may be roughly c l a s -  
s i f i e d  under two headings:  f i n e  tun ing  and r e t o o l i n g .  Examples 
of f i n e  t u n i n g . a r e  P r e s i d e n t  F o r d ' s  and P r e s i d e n t  C a r t e r ' s  r equ i r e -  
ments t h a t  major d e c i s i o n s  be j u s t i f i e d  by " i n f l a t i o n  impact  s t a t e -  
ments" o r  "economic impact  statements",  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  economy-wide 
consequences of new r u l e s .  However, it has  been argued t h a t  "most 
of t h e  s t a t emen t s  were probably done a s  p a r t  of t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
process  a f t e r  d e c i s i o n s  had been made, r a t h e r  than  a s  p a r t  of t h e  
p r e p a r a t o r y  work f o r  making d e c i s i o n s  on whether  t o  invoke new 
r e g u l a t i o n s " .  " Moreover, g iven  t h e  s t a t e - o f  - t h e - a r t  i n  c o s t -  
b e n e f i t  and r i s k - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s ,  and t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of  e s t i -  
mating env i ronmenta l  and h e a l t h  b e n e f i t s ,  t h e  demand f o r  con- 
c l u s i v e  s c i e n t i f i c  ev idence  and thorough economic a n a l y s e s  b e f o r e  
a  s t a n d a r d  i s  adopted i s  more l i k e l y  t o  d e l a y  p u b l i c  a c t i o n  t h a n  
t o  improve t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  d e c i s i o n d i n g  and t o  g e n e r a t e  d i s s e n -  
s i o n  r a t h e r  t han  consensus .  
By r e t o o l i n g  I mean t h e  proposed replacement  of t h e  cumber- 
some sys tem of s t a n d a r d s ,  l i c e n s e s ,  and p r o h i b i t i o n s  by e f f l u e n t  
c h a r g e s ,  p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s ,  and i n j u r y  t a x e s .  G r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e  
on market  i n c e n t i v e s  would c e r t a i n l y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  and 
e f f i c i e n c y  of s o c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n .  S e r i o u s  t e c h n i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
problems remain t o  be so lved ,  however. Cons ider ,  f o r  example, 
t h e  u s e  of  e f f l u e n t  c h a r g e s  t o  reduce  t h e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  of a  
c e r t a i n  p o l l u t a n t .  I f  t h e  damage caused by d i f f e r e n t  concen t ra -  
t i o n s  o f  t h e  p o l l u t a n t  w e r e  known, t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  cou ld  simply 
e s t a b l i s h  a  cha rge  o r  p r i c e  e q u a l  t o  t h e  marg ina l  damage . f o r  
each u n i t  of r e s i d u a l s .  P o l l u t e r s  would t h e n  d e c r e a s e  t h e i r  re- 
s i d u a l  f l ows ,  as l ong  a s  t h e  marg ina l  c o s t s  of do ing  so were less 
than  t h e  p r i c e  f o r  d i s c h a r g i n g ,  s e t t l i n g  a t  t h e  ogtimurn where 
marg ina l  t r e a t m e n t  c o s t s  equa led  t h e  charge .  But u s u a l l y  t h e  
damage f u n c t i o n  i s  unknown and one must r e v e r t  t o  (more o r  less 
a r b i t r a r i l y  de te rmined)  environmenta l  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d s .  Also ,  
f o r  any g iven  l e v e l  of  e f f l u e n t  cha rge s ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  r e d u c t i o n  
i n  p o l l u t i o n  is  ach ieved  a t  t h e  l e a s t  cos t ,  b u t  t h e r e  is  no guar-  
a n t e e  t h a t  t h e  c h a r g e s  w i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a ch i eve  t h e  d e s i r e d  
l e v e l  of environmenta l  q u a l i t y  ( conve r se ly ,  g iven  a  c e r t a i n  
environmental  o b j e c t i v e  and app rop r i a t e  enforcement procedures ,  
e f f l u e n t  s t anda rds  can always be c a l c u l a t e d  s o  a s  t o  s a t i s f y  
t h e  o b j e c t i v e ;  bu t  t h e r e  i s  no way of knowing whether t h e  objec-  
t i v e  w i l l  be met i n  an economically e f f i c i e n t  way). F i n a l l y ,  
market s o l u t i o n s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  implement i n  c e r t a i n  impor tan t  
ca ses  where h e a l t h  damages (caused,  f o r  example, by carc inogenic  
a g e n t s )  can be d e t e c t e d  on ly  a f t e r  many yea r s .  
The s e r i o u s n e s s  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  problems of  reform i s  indicated 
by t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  a l though  economists  have shown aga in  and aga in  
t h a t  e f f l u e n t  charges  a r e  s u p e r i o r  t o  o t h e r  ins t ruments  of  envi-  
ronmental p o l i c y  i n  terms of e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and e f f i c i e n c y ,  environ- 
mental  l e g i s l a t i o n  con t inues  t o  r e l y  on a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l s .  
S i m i l a r l y  unpopular a r e  p roposa ls  t o  i n t roduce  " i n j u r y  t a x e s " ,  
o r  t o  r a i s e  i n su rance  charges  t o  cover  t h e  r e a l  c o s t s  of indus- 
t r i a l  a c c i d e n t  and g i v e  f i rms  a  r e a l  i n c e n t i v e  t o  improve t h e i r  
h e a l t h  and s a f e t y  performance. One may argue about t h e  reasons  
f o r  t h e  widespread r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  use of market i n c e n t i v e s  
( i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  t h i s  r e s i s t a n c e  can be reasonably expla ined  by a  
model of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  cho ice  which inc ludes  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n - c h a n g i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  of t h e  regulated) , '*  b u t  it i s  a  
f a c t  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  e x i s t  and s e t  narrow l i m i t s  t o  
r e g u l a t o r y  reform. 
The major d e f i c i e n c y  of a t t empt s  a t  r e t o o l i n g  o r  f i n e  tun ing  
p r e s e n t  p o l i c i e s  i s  t h a t  they  do n o t  pay s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
t h e  c o g n i t i v e  complexity of t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  t a s k s .  Consider,  f o r  
example, t h e  problem of nuc l ea r  s a f e t y .  The r i s k  of a  major 
nuc l ea r  a c c i d e n t  i s  q u i t e  low, bu t  i t s  consequences can be very 
l a r g e  indeed.  Hence, an o b j e c t i v e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of r i s k s  i s  extremely 
d i f f i c u l t ,  and each r i s k  problem r e p r e s e n t s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  unique 
s i t u a t i o n .  Under t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  b u r e a u c r a t i c  r e g u l a t i o n  may 
be expec ted  t o  f a i l .  Bureaucracy rel ies  on f i x e d  r u l e s  a p p l i c a b l e  
t o  r e p e t i t i v e  and s t a n d a r d i z e d  s i t u a t i o n s ,  and h e n c e , i t  c an  be 
e f f e c t i v e  on ly  when t h e  number o f  e x c e p t i o n s  i s  sma l l  and when 
t h e r e  i s  a  s t a b l e  b a s i s  of knowledge from which s o l u t i o n s  may be 
d e r i v e d  i n  more o r  less au tomat ic  f a s h i o n .  But a l s o  market  so lu -  
t i o n s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  implement when r i s k s  a r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n -  
c a l c u l a b l e  and damage f u n c t i o n s  p r a c t i c a l l y  unbounded. 
A p o s s i b l e  r e s o l u t i o n  of t h i s  antinomy can on ly  be ske tched  
h e r e .  I t  c o n s i s t s  i n  r e p l a c i n g  a s  much a s  p o s s i b l e  s t a t u t o r y  
r e g u l a t i o n s  by n o n s t a t u t o r y  codes and s t a n d a r d s .  This  i m p l i e s ,  
among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  a  novel  s t y l e  o f  c o n s u l t a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n s  wi th  
s t r o n g  p a r t i c i p a t i v e  o v e r t o n e s ,  and r e l i a n c e  on p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  
r a t h e r  t h a n  h i e r a r c h y  a s  t h e  o r g a n i z i n g  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  
agenc ies .  
The p r a c t i c a l  meaning of  t h i s  sugges t i on  may be i l l u s t r a t e d  
by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  f i e l d  o f  occupa t i ona l  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y .  The 
main t a s k  o f  a  p r o f e s s i o n a l l y  o rgan i zed  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y  i n spec to -  
r a t e  would n o t  be ,  a s  it i s  a t  p r e s e n t ,  t h a t  o f  e n s u r i n g  compliance 
wi th  minimum l e g a l  r equ i r emen t s .  Ra ther ,  i n s p e c t o r s  would be con- 
ce rned  w i th  t h e  broad a s p e c t s  of s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  a t  t h e  work- 
p l a c e s  they  v i s i t ,  a s  much a s  w i th  t h o s e  narrow a s p e c t s  which may 
have been t h e  s u b j e c t  of d e t a i l e d  r e g u l a t i o n .  The p r o v i s i o n  o f  
s k i l l e d  and i m p a r t i a l  adv i ce  and a s s i s t a n c e  would become one o f  
t h e i r  most impor t an t  f u n c t i o n s .  R ig id  and uniform l e g a l  r u l e s  
cou ld  then  be replaced by s t a n d a r d s  and behav io ra l  norms developed 
by i n d u s t r y  i t s e l f  ( j o i n t l y  by workers and management) , and by 
independent r e s e a r c h  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and p r o f e s s i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  
Thus, a  p r o f s s s i o n a l  model of r e g u l a t i o n  would r e l y  l e s s  on laws 
and more on vo lun ta ry  s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n  a t  t h e  i n d u s t r y  and p l a n t  
l e v e l .  I n  t h i s  system t h e  i n s p e c t o r s  would en joy  a  cons ide rab le  
degree of autonomy, and t h e  i n t e r n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  t h e  regula -  
t o r y  agency would use a  minimum of h i e r a r c h i c a l  c o n t r o l ,  r e l y i n g  
i n s t e a d  on i n t e n s e  c o n s u l t a t i o n  and peer  review. I n c i d e n t a l l y ,  
somewhat s i m i l a r  p roposa l s  have been made i n  1 9 7 2  by t h e  B r i t i s h  
Committee on S a f e t y  and Health a t  Work (Robens Committee) , and 
have found wide acceptance i n  t h e  Heal th  and S a f e t y  a t  Work Act 
of 1976 .  
I t  may be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  model of  s o c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n  pro- 
posed he re  i s  simply a  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  d i s c r e d i t e d  ideology of ex- 
p e r t i s e .  My r e p l y  i s  t h a t  t h e  assumptions a r e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  
The p r o f e s s i o n a l  model does n o t  presuppose t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  
f i rm  body of s t anda rd i zed  knowledge from which r e g u l a t o r s  could 
d e r i v e  ready-made s o l u t i o n s .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  codes of  p rofes -  
s i o n a l  behavior  have been developed t o  d e a l  wi th  s i t u a t i o n s  where 
t he  p rov ide r  of a  s e r v i c e  must r e l y ,  t o  a  g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  
on i d i o s y n c r a t i c  in format ion  and " t a c i t "  knowledge. When know- 
ledge becomes s t anda rd i zed  ( a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of much engineer ing  
and some medical  knowledge), p r o f e s s i o n a l  r u l e s  can be rep laced  
by b u r e a u c r a t i c  o r  manager ia l  forms of c o n t r o l .  
But what about  t h e  i s s u e  of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n  and 
p o l i t i c a l  l e g i t i m a t i o n ?  Would t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  model g ive  exces- 
s i v e  power t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r s ?  The answer t o  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  i s  
i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  preceding d i s c u s s i o n .  The proposed model of regu- 
l a t i o n  s h i f t s  t h e  emphasis from l e g a l  enforcement t o  t h e  p rov i s ion  
of in format ion  and high q u a l i t y  advice .  I n  t u r n ,  t h i s  presup- 
poses g r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e  on s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n  and p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a -  
t i o n  i n  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  process .  
I n  t he  ca se  of occupa t iona l  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y ,  major respon- 
s i b i l i t y  f o r  developing l o c a l l y  adequate  r u l e s  would r e s t  wi th  
management and employees ( o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) .  I n  o t h e r  
f i e l d s ,  such a s  t h e  environment, va r ious  i n t e r e s t  groups should 
be provided wi th  r e l e v a n t  in format ion ,  and given t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
of cha l l eng ing  i n  t h e  c o u r t s  o r  a t  pub l i c  i n q u i r i e s  p roposa ls  
wi th  adverse  environmental  e f f e c t s ,  o r  t o  comment on d r a f t  laws 
and r e g u l a t i o n s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  environment ( t o  some e x t e n t ,  t h i s  
is  a l r eady  t a k i n g  p l ace  i n  some c o u n t r i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  
ca se  of a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  p lanning pe rmis s ions ) .  
Of course ,  t h e  ca se  f o r  more p ro fe s s iona l i sm and l e s s  bureau- 
c racy  has  been b a r e l y  o u t l i n e d .  Much d e t a i l e d  work remains t o  be 
done, b u t  I am convinced t h a t  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l - c h o i c e  approach 
w i l l  be as f r u i t f u l  he re  as it has  been i n  t h e  s tudy  of markets 
and h i e r a r c h i e s .  
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